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Rural Households’ Social Reproduction in China’s Agrarian Transition: 
Wage Employment and Family Farming1 
 
Qian Forrest Zhang 
Abstract:  
Wage employment has penetrated deeply into rural households’ livelihoods and has become a 
central pillar in China’s rural economy. In the past three decades, three developments 
propelled the growth of wage employment: rural industrialization, rural-to-urban migration, 
and rise of capitalist agriculture. These developments brought in a decisive break to the 
trajectory of China’s agrarian transition: the traditional model of household reproduction 
based on family farming and handicraft production has now been replaced by a new one in 
which wage employment and family farming are closely bonded in a myriad of ways – 
through both the household-level division of labour and individual-level circulation of labour 
between the two. 	  
                                                
1 For citation: Zhang, Qian Forrest. 2015 ‘Rural households’ social reproduction in China’s agrarian 
transition: Wage employment and family farming.’ In Carlos Oya and Nichola Pontara (eds.), Rural 
Wage Employment in Developing Countries: Theory, Evidence and Policy. London: Routledge, 230-
253. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of wage labour was traditionally underdeveloped in rural China. By combining 
handicraft industry with family farming, rural households were able to out-compete labour-
hiring farms and small enterprises with self-exploitation of family labour and low production 
costs. The collectivization of the rural economy during the socialist era, however, decisively 
shifted rural China onto a different development trajectory by simultaneously organizing 
farmers into wage-based collective farming, suppressing household-based petty commodity 
production, and creating a rural industrial base that relied on upon wage labour. Even though 
the decollectivization reform restored family farming, the penetration of wage employment 
continued to deepen, propelled successively by rural industrialization, rural-to-urban 
migration, and rise of capitalist agriculture. In today’s rural China, for a large majority of the 
population, wage employment has become a central pillar in their social reproduction. Yet, a 
shift in rural labour towards wage employment is not driven by a widespread 
proletarianization process; instead, wage work is usually bonded with family farming and 
other types of petty commodity production through various forms of the household division 
of labour. As a result of the prevalence of wage employment and the variable and diverse 
ways it is pursued in rural households, wage employment has also become a central 
dimension in creating socioeconomic differentiation.  
In this chapter, I first briefly review the historical evolution of wage employment in China’s 
rural economy in the past two centuries.  I then document the growth of various forms of 
wage work in rural China during the Reform era (1978 to present) and analyse the political-
economic conditions that gave rise to the unique patterns of wage employment growth. 
Following that, I examine the fluidity, complexity and fragmentation of wage employment in 
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rural China today, with a particular focus on the various ways in which wage employment is 
combined with family farming in rural households’ pursuit of social reproduction.  I also 
discuss the impact of rising wage employment on rural social differentiation and class 
dynamics. 
2. Historical Background  
In pre-revolution China, the rural economy, and especially agriculture, was dominated by 
smallholders. In the early 20th century, while the commercialization of agriculture and 
industry increased, the number of labour-hiring managerial farms actually declined, and both 
agricultural proletarianization and growth of wage employment stalled. In the 1930s, for 
example, some estimates maintain that hired wage labour shrunk to only 3 per cent of the 
total agricultural labour force in the Yangzi delta (Huang 1990). The high population density 
and small sizes of most family farms in rural China meant that these agricultural producers 
faced a crisis of social reproduction, which could lead to agricultural proletarianization and 
growth of wage employment. But what in fact had made these smallholding rural families so 
resilient was the bonding of handicraft industry with agricultural production within the 
households, so that the petty commodity production in handicrafts by auxiliary family labour 
supplemented and supported family farming. These half-agriculture, half-handicraft 
households were thus able to pay higher land rents than managerial farms relying on the more 
costly hired labour, and drove out the latter. Wage work, to the extent that it existed, was in 
fact mostly engaged by poor peasants, whose handicrafts production was insufficient to 
guarantee a minimum standard of living and had to hire themselves out as part-time day 
labourers during busy seasons (Huang 1990). While wage employment became an important 
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source of income for these poor peasant families, proletarianization of the rural labour force 
did not happen extensively.  
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the land reform in early 1950s 
allowed smallholder family farms to continue for a brief period on a more egalitarian basis. 
But the collectivization of agriculture and rural economy that started in the late 1950s 
fundamentally altered the social organization of production in rural China. In collective 
farming, when both agricultural and handicraft production were organized in collective units 
(from production teams, to brigades, and to communes), the vast majority of rural dwellers 
engaged in a type of wage employment: their work in the fields or in factories earned them 
work points, which were then used to calculate their compensation in money or in-kind. Since 
land and other means of production had become collectively owned and household handicraft 
production largely eliminated, differential labour endowments and wage incomes became the 
main cause of inequality among families in the same collective units.  
Strictly speaking, wage employment under collective agriculture was not based on 
commoditization of labour, as rural workers were neither freed of means of production 
(collectively, they were the owners) nor free to move. But the organization of production at a 
supra-familial level and the relationship of authority in such organizations resembled those in 
commodified wage employment, and thus, one could argue, collective farming prepared them 
for the wage work that soon emerged when decollectivization began.  
The decollectivization reform in the late 1970s dismantled collective farming and returned 
Chinese agriculture to family-based, small-scale production. Except for the several millions 
of agricultural workers employed in around 2,000 state-owned farms and at least 30 million 
employed in rural nonfarm enterprises, nearly three hundred million rural producers in China 
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changed from wage workers earning work points from collectives to small proprietors 
engaging in either subsistence farming or petty commodity production on farmland allocated 
to them by contract. 
As a form of membership entitlement, rural residents had secure access to the land owned by 
the collectives (the names of which were changed from production teams and brigades to 
villager groups and villages). The use rights of farmland were allocated to members on 
egalitarian principles and through contractual arrangements, which, in the early years, bound 
them to fulfil mandatory quotas of grain delivery to the state. In most places, besides the 
contracted farmland (zeren tian, or chengbao tian), rural households were also allocated 
additional farmland called kouliang tian (subsistence land), over which they had more stable 
and comprehensive rights. Each rural household also received at least one piece of ‘housing 
construction land’ (zhaiji di) to build a house.  
Starting in the mid-1990s, the use rights of other types of collectively owned rural land, 
including forestland, grassland and wasteland, have also been devolved from the collectives 
to individual households. When the 15-year tenure of the first round of land contracts with 
the state expired in the mid-1990s, the central government – in an effort to strengthen tenure 
security and boost land investment – mandated a 30-year-tenure, second-round land 
contracts. In rural China today, some restrictions on farmers’ land use rights still apply 
(farmland cannot be transferred to nonfarm uses), and, despite the central mandate, re-
allocation of contract land within villages still happens (but much less frequently). But most 
rural households, defined by a rural household registration and thus a membership in a village 
collective, have a solid footing for continuing smallholding agricultural production. Farmers’ 
land can still be expropriated by the state for nonfarm uses, and in the rapid urbanization 
process in recent years many rural residents have indeed become landless as a result of both 
6 
 
legal land expropriation and illegal land grabs. But compared with smallholders in other 
developing countries, rural China’s dual-track land system (collective ownership plus 
individualized use rights) helps to shield family farmers from other threats of dispossession.  
On the eve of the reform, rural China was at a critical juncture. The tumultuous Mao years 
brought some positive changes: predatory landed property was eliminated through land 
reform, and large-scale labour mobilization under collectivization lead to improved 
agricultural infrastructure (Bramall 2009). But the suppression and near elimination of 
household sideline industrial and handicraft productions, which had traditionally been one of 
the ‘twin crutches’ (Huang 1990) that sustained the reproduction of peasant households and 
rural economy in pre-revolution China, stifled the vitality of the rural economy. How would 
the rural economy evolve after decollectivization? Large-scale, capital-intensive, and labour-
hiring farms would proletarianize the peasantry and reduce labour needs in agriculture. The 
absence of any sizable private capital, the state’s concern with the political consequences of 
dispossessing peasants, and the strong land rights granted to rural households all precluded 
this option. On the other hand, family farming was restored and put on the solid institutional 
base of the dual-track land system, and the state had replaced the predatory landed gentry 
class and also relaxed its extraction from agriculture by increasing grain prices. China’s rural 
economy seemed all but destined to return to the traditional path of the dual production of 
household-based farming and petty commodity industries. Wage employment would continue 
to be marginal.  
But as it turned out, China’s rural economy took an unexpected turn. While family farming 
continued, wage employment experienced explosive growth, mainly in nonfarm activities. 
Thirty years after the reform started, wage employment has fundamentally transformed the 
socioeconomic landscape of rural China. By 2010, out of a total rural population of 670 
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million and a labour force of around 490 million, around 220 million were in nonfarm 
employment, including 159 million in rural areas and about 120-140 million as migrant 
workers in cities.2 The great majority of them were in wage work, with only a minority in 
self-employment or entrepreneurship (NBS 2011).  
3. China’s Transition to Capitalism and the Growth of Rural Wage 
Employment 
In today’s rural China, wage employment has become a central part in the rural economy and 
source of income for rural households. In the official national statistics, wage income as a 
proportion of rural residents’ average per capita income rose from 19 per cent in 1985 to 41 
per cent in 2010, while income from household-based production (including farming) now 
only accounts for 48 per cent (NBS 2011). In other national surveys that used more fine-
tuned measures to capture the diversity of wage income, the figure is even higher. A 
randomized survey of 100 counties in 2007, for example, finds that income from family 
farming and sideline activities only constitutes 36.6 per cent of the average per capita income 
of rural residents, while incomes from migratory and local wage employment contribute, 
respectively, 41 per cent and 22 per cent (Han 2009, 182). Three successive changes in the 
rural political economy have fuelled this sustained growth of wage employment in rural 
                                                
2 There is overlap between these two types due to the part-time nature of both rural and migratory 
nonfarm employment. In this chapter, nonfarm employment refers to any work in industrial and 
service sectors, but does not include wage work in agriculture.  
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China in the past thirty years: rural industrialization, rural-to-urban migration, and rise of 
capitalist agriculture.  
3.1. Wage employment in township-and-village enterprises (TVEs) 
The success of China’s rural development is really that of rural industrialization: by 2010, 
rural industries in China employed 159 million workers and produced a total output value of 
46 trillion yuan (MOA 2011).3 China’s success in rural industrialization is puzzling not only 
because it has been so rarely accomplished in other developing countries, but also because it 
represented such a decisive break from China’s own path of under-development in the pre-
revolution and late imperial eras. Many studies have tried to explain this puzzle. Those that 
explain the success as primarily driven by either private enterprises (Huang 2008) or foreign 
investment (Whiting 2001) not only fail to see the historical context that made reform-era 
rural industrialization possible, but also neglect the crucial role played by publicly owned 
TVEs and local states (Oi 1999). Other explanations that highlight how rural industrialization 
policies during the Maoist era laid the foundation for rapid industrialization during the reform 
era are far more convincing (Bramall 2009; Putterman 1997). However, even these works, 
which focus on the industrial capacity and skills base created in rural areas, overlook the 
changes in how industrial production was organized in rural China during the Maoist era. I 
argue that another important legacy of the Maoist rural industrialization is that it decisively 
changed the balance between household-based petty commodity production and industrial 
                                                
3 One yuan is approximately 0.16 US dollar.  
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production using wage labour in the latter’s favour, and thus switched rural China’s 
development in the reform era onto a path that depends heavily on wage labour. 
In an influential recent book, MIT Professor Yasheng Huang (2008), puts forward a radical 
re-interpretation of China’s rural industrialization experiences, in which he argues that ‘the 
overwhelming majority of TVEs, even at the early stage of the reforms, were actually private 
(ibid., 77),’ and thus, China’s rural industrialization miracle was a manifestation of the 
classical theorems of economic development about private-sector dynamism (Huang 2008). 
This argument, besides flying in the face of his own data,4 overlooks the profound socio-
political differences between wage employment and family production.  
From a neo-institutional perspective, what is puzzling about China’s rural development is the 
issue of property ownership; hence the debate is between those who praise the advantages of 
public ownership (Stiglitz 1994; Che and Qian 1998) and those who laud private-sector 
dynamism (Huang 2008; Whiting 2001). Yet, I contend that, for understanding social change 
in rural China, it is far more useful to focus instead on the changes in the form of production. 
                                                
4 Private TVEs only became the majority when the huge number of single-proprietorship household 
businesses (totalling 18.3 million in 2002, compared to only 3 million labour-hiring enterprises) was 
lumped together with them (Huang 2008, 79). But these household-based sideline productions were 
not labour-hiring enterprises. If they are excluded, the number of private rural enterprises only 
surpassed that of collective enterprises in 1995, when the privatization of former collective TVEs was 
well underway. Even when household businesses were included, collective TVEs still employed more 
people than private firms and household businesses combined up until 1989, a full decade into the 
reform. Even in 2002, the last year of Huang’s data, collective TVEs still employed 38 million 
workers compared to private firms’ 35 million.  
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The economics literature, in its focus on the many similarities of household businesses and 
privately owned TVEs, has missed a fundamental difference between them: the former is 
household-based petty commodity production; the latter can be characterised as labour-hiring 
capitalist production. Thus, by lumping tens of millions of household businesses together 
with labour-hiring enterprises, Huang (2008) conflates two distinctive historical processes 
and significantly overstates the dominance of private ownership. The growth of household 
businesses is simply the revival of the traditional household-based petty commodity 
production that has long existed in rural China. By contrast, the growth of labour-hiring firms 
represents a break from the past – it gives rise to capitalistic wage labour and the ensuing 
social differentiation of the peasantry and transformation of rural households’ production and 
reproduction. 
Historically, nonfarm wage employment in rural China had been suppressed by household 
sideline production bonded with family farming. If this is the case, what factors have enabled 
wage employment in rural enterprises – regardless of whether private or otherwise – to grow 
so rapidly after twenty years of collectivization? The rise of industrial technologies that 
cannot be employed on a family scale and allow larger-scale enterprises to outperform family 
production certainly created more space for labour-hiring firms to grow. But what 
collectivization did was more crucial: it provided the collective labour-hiring firms and future 
private firms with the much needed capital accumulation, entrepreneurial and managerial 
talents, and a relatively healthy and literate rural labour force – thanks to the socialist state’s 
investment in improving rural human capital – that was accustomed to wage work conditions 
(Putterman 1997; Bramall 2009). At the same time, collectivization also suppressed 
household-based sideline production, which in the past had depressed the growth of labour-
hiring firms with its lower labour cost. 
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The curtailment of rural households’ sideline nonfarm activities started during the land 
reform (Bramall 2009). The collectivization campaign in the 1950s further consolidated 
traditional handicrafts production by rural households into small collective enterprises run by 
brigades and communes known as commune-and-brigade enterprises (CBEs). In the 
collectivized rural economy, after much of the surplus was extracted by the state to fund its 
industrialization plan, the rest was concentrated from rural households into collective units, 
which could then be invested in collectively owned industrial firms (Putterman 1997). By the 
end of 1959, this over-zealous development of CBEs had increased the total number of 
workers employed in CBEs to 18 million across the country (Yan 2007). After a period of 
rapid decline following the disastrous Great Leap Forward, CBEs started to rebound in the 
late 1960s. By 1979, roughly 1.5 million CBEs, employing over 29 million workers (about 9 
per cent of the total rural employment), accounted for 30 per cent of the total gross output 
value in rural China and 15 per cent of the national industrial output (MOA 1985) – an 
industrial foundation rarely found in the rural economies of other developing countries.  
The consolidation of handicraft and industrial production previously spread in hundreds of 
millions of rural households into larger-scale production in collective CBEs amounted to a 
dispossession of rural households of their means of nonfarm production and the partial 
proletarianization of the rural labour force by an industrializing state in lieu of the capitalist 
class. As a result, the collective period irreversibly switched rural China’s nonfarm economy 
onto a path that diverged from the traditional model of family-based industries to one based 
on wage employment in supra-familial firms. Even when the decollectivization reform 
revived household-based sideline production, it could no longer hold back the growth of 
labour-hiring firms as had historically been the case. 
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The growth of household businesses during the reform era has been strong: from 10 million 
units in 1985 to 21 million in 2010, and from a total employment of 23.5 million persons in 
1985 to 60.8 in 2010 (MOA 2011). But it is essentially a continuation of the traditional 
pattern of household-based sideline production of various types of handicrafts and petty 
commodities. What sets this period apart from pre-revolution China is the rapid growth of 
nonfarm rural enterprises using wage labour, which, in 2010, numbered 6.2 million and 
employed nearly 100 million workers.5 In pre-revolution China, household-based industrial 
production, because of its advantage in labour use intensity, depressed the growth of labour-
hiring enterprises. But in the reform period, thanks to the advantage in capital and technology 
that the labour-hiring CBEs gained during collectivization, wage employment in rural 
enterprises took off despite continued competition from household businesses. 
This rise of labour-hiring firms, which changes both the social organization of production and 
the social nature of a huge number of producers, is far more consequential to China’s rural 
society and economy than the ownership structure of these firms. It not only turned rural 
industries into the main engine of growth for the rural economy and rural household income, 
which sets China apart from other developing countries; it also altered the dynamics of rural 
households’ social reproduction. Now, except for a minority of households (at most 15 per 
                                                
5 Among these labour-hiring firms, nearly half were in manufacturing industries and another 20 per 
cent in wholesale and retail commerce; only 2.8 per cent were in agricultural business (MOA 2011). 
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cent)6 that continued with household businesses, the rise of labour-hiring firms bankrupted 
the traditional model of half-agriculture half-handicraft household production. Instead, it 
introduced labour commodification into the lives of a vast number of rural households, and 
made them dependent on wage employment for their social reproduction. It also started the 
social differentiation of the Chinese peasantry by creating new classes of labour. These 
changes, as I intend to show here, have profound impacts on social relationships and social 
structure in rural China.  
3.2. Wage employment through migration 
Economic development in reform-era China followed a highly uneven spatial pattern. Wage 
employment opportunities were heavily concentrated in coastal regions, where both the 
development of domestic TVEs and influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) fuelled an 
explosive growth of manufacturing jobs. Even though policies during the Maoist era helped 
to hold in check spatial inequality in rural industrial development, regions that had favourable 
geographic conditions and historical foundations still experienced faster growth.  Later, the 
reform greatly exacerbated the spatially uneven process of rural industrialization. Coastal 
regions not only inherited advantages provided by geography and history, but were further 
aided by the fiscal decentralization reform, which freed them from the central government’s 
fiscal redistribution, and they benefitted from a much greater inflow of FDI (Bramall 2009). 
In 2010, for example, 53 per cent of the total employment in TVEs (excluding household 
                                                
6 The total employment in household businesses in 2010 is 60.8 million, which is roughly 15 per cent 
of the total rural employment of 414.2 million (MOA 2011). This is an overestimate, as many 
households that operate household businesses also engage in wage work.  
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businesses) was concentrated in just four coastal provinces: Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and 
Guangdong (MOA 2011). The influx of FDI was similarly skewed toward these coastal 
provinces, further exacerbating regional disparities in wage employment opportunities. From 
1983 to 1993, the share of the 12 provinces in the coastal region in the national total of 
utilized FDI stayed at around 90 per cent; Guangdong province alone accounted for 35 per 
cent (Sun and Dutta 1997).  
This spatially imbalanced pattern of economic growth triggered another fundamental change 
that transformed rural China: a massive out-migration of the rural labour force from inland to 
coastal regions. The gradual formation of a national market has exposed both the weaker 
TVEs and household businesses in inland regions to intensifying competition from the more 
advanced TVEs and urban enterprises in the developed coastal regions. This development 
created a crisis of reproduction for many rural households in inland regions. The petty 
commodity production arm of the ‘twin crutches’ that had helped sustain the reproduction of 
rural households was again severely weakened in these regions – this time, not by 
collectivization, but by market competition from capitalistic firms located in cities and 
coastal regions. At the same time, the decline of local TVEs was depleting wage employment 
opportunities from the inland regions, which could otherwise have absorbed the surplus 
labour. Not surprisingly, the surplus rural labour from inland regions started to chase, on a 
massive scale, wage employment opportunities that were shifting to coastal regions.7  
                                                
7 This trend, however, has been reversed in recent years due to rising labour costs in coastal regions 
and improved industrial infrastructure in inland regions (Chan 2010). 
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During the Mao era, despite the strong economic incentives for residents to migrate to cities, 
the implementation of the household registration (hukou) system, which in effect created an 
‘apartheid’ system segregating rural and urban residents, and the administrative allocation of 
jobs and rationing of consumer goods in cities, effectively curbed such migration (Chan and 
Zhang 1999). But as the market reform started to create demand for cheap labour in the 
coastal regions, where new manufacturing jobs were concentrated, the state gradually relaxed 
migration control since the mid-1980s. The floodgate was opened. One study estimates that 
the number of migrant labourers from rural areas in 1983 was only two million, but soon 
increased to 30 million in 1989, and 62 million in 1993 (Han 2009, 5). In the second 
agricultural census conducted in 2006, the number of migrant workers from rural areas has 
increased to 132 million, and, as a percentage of rural labour force, risen from 7 per cent to 
26 per cent between 1995 to 2006 (Han 2009). It is probably impossible to measure the 
number of rural migrants accurately, but these orders of magnitude are not in dispute. 
For rural migrants, while their destinations are varied – they can end up in cities, but also in 
rural-based TVEs, and a small minority even in agricultural wage work – the vast majority 
remain tethered to their rural homes. This is not only because their household registration is 
still with their original villages; but more importantly, as will be discussed in details later, 
their migration is only transient and part of a household strategy of division of labour. They 
not only send back remittance to families in rural areas to sustain the reproduction of family 
farming there; they also rely on family farming in the home villages to sustain their own 
social reproduction. It is therefore essential to consider rural migrants as an integral part of 
the rural economy, despite their physical location in cities.  
Rural industrialization and out-migration in the past thirty years has transformed China’s 
rural economy from one dominated by household-based agriculture to one dominated by 
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nonfarm wage employment. Wage employment in rural industries, migratory wage 
employment, and family-based farming and petty commodity production have become the 
three pillars that support rural livelihoods in China today. The relative importance of these 
three income sources, however, varies greatly across regions.  
In the coastal areas of China, where the TVEs are the most developed, rural industrialization 
has thoroughly de-agrarianized the rural economy. The great majority of the rural labour 
force has moved into nonfarm employment, mostly in local TVEs and family businesses, 
while the agricultural sector now only employs a small minority: in 2010, it ranges from 19 
per cent in the municipalities of Shanghai and Beijing to 27 per cent and 33 per cent, 
respectively, in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces (NBS 2011). In these coastal provinces, the 
ratio of wage income in total income can be above 60 per cent (in 2010, 60.8 per cent in 
Guangdong and 68.7 per cent in Shanghai) (NBS 2011).  
In contrast, in the less developed inland and western regions, migration is the main channel 
that transfers the rural labour into nonfarm employment, while nonfarm employment in local 
TVEs is limited. A 2006 survey of 1,086 villages in seven inland and western provinces, for 
example, finds that the percentage of the rural labour force that has entered migratory 
nonfarm employment ranges from 25-48 per cent, a ratio that is three to five times higher 
than those in local nonfarm jobs (Li 2009). Most rural migrants’ nonfarm employment is 
wage work. A 2007 survey of 300 villages in 28 provinces finds that 76.6 per cent of rural 
migrants are in wage employment, 15 per cent in self-employment or private 
entrepreneurship. This ratio is even higher for those from western and inland provinces (80.9 
and 77.8 per cent, respectively) (Han 2009, 239). Thus, in these regions, wage income – 
mostly from migrant work – also constitutes a high proportion of rural households’ total 
income – for example, 44.2 per cent in Sichuan and 47.2 per cent in Hunan in 2010 (NBS 
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2011). It is only in regions where the relative abundance of land has made family farming 
more profitable and even sufficient to sustain rural households’ social reproduction that we 
find a low percentage of wage income in household income – for example, only 17.2 per cent 
in Jilin, 20 per cent in Heilongjiang, and 18.8 per cent in Inner Mongolia (NBS 2011).  
Although the centrality of wage income to the rural economy and to the livelihoods of rural 
households can show the success of rural industrialization, diversification of the rural 
economy, and urbanization of the rural labour force, it also reveals the challenges that rural 
households now face in pursuing social reproduction through family farming. In many rural 
areas, farming activities can no longer sustain rural households’ social reproduction. One 
study, for example, finds that in poor villages in northern Shanxi, for a typical household of 
four, the annual per capita income from farming (including revenues from growing one 
harvest of maize on less than a hectare of land, raising five to six pigs and sheep, receiving 
the 75 yuan per hectare state subsidy, and doing other sideline farming productions) amounts 
to slightly over 1000 yuan; yet, the low-end estimate of the household’s annual consumption 
(not including big-ticket items such as wedding and house construction) adds to 1537 yuan 
(Li 2009, 410). This shortfall of one third of the cost of basic reproduction has to come from 
nonfarm incomes – and, as the data cited earlier show, predominantly from wage income. 
Some estimates that in key grain producing regions, where farmers specialize in the low-
return staple grains, 500 to 600 billion yuan of nonfarm income were pumped into rural 
households, mainly through remittances from migrant workers, to sustain the reproduction of 
subsistence family farming (Li 2009). This value nearly equals the total market value of the 
annual grain production in the whole country.  
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3.3. Wage employment in capitalist agriculture 
While traditional small-scale, subsistence-oriented family farming of staple grains has 
become increasingly unable to sustain social reproduction for rural households, the massive 
exodus of rural labour to nonfarm wage employment has also created opportunities for the 
transformation of family farming. Demographic changes in rural areas, including the decline 
of natural birth rate and massive labour transfer out of agriculture, and lifestyle changes in 
cities, such as the rising consumption of meat, dairy, fruits, and processed foods, are making 
two changes in agricultural production not only possible, but even urgent (Huang and Peng 
2007). First, the increasing availability of farmland now allows for larger-scale production 
that goes beyond the household boundary and uses hired wage labour. Second, household 
producers can also shift to market-oriented, specialized production of higher-value foods to 
earn higher incomes from agriculture. These are precisely the two processes through which 
the transition to capitalist agriculture is unfolding in China: the emergence of supra-family 
units of production based on wage labour and the commoditization of family farming (Zhang 
and Donaldson 2010). The transition to capitalist agriculture in rural China, therefore, creates 
a new round of growth in wage employment that finally brings wage labour extensively into 
agricultural production.  
The seasonal use of wage labour in agriculture emerged soon after decollectivization, 
especially in areas that faced labour shortage; but wage employment on longer terms and 
larger scales in agriculture is a more recent phenomenon. The emergence of spontaneous land 
rental markets in rural China has allowed farmland – especially that left behind by migrants – 
to concentrate in in the hands of some larger farmers, who, thanks to their advantages in 
either production skills or market access, are able to specialize in higher-value foods and pay 
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rents higher than the incomes families can earn from subsistence farming. The enlarged 
scales of production often make hired wage labour indispensable to these entrepreneurial 
farmers; at the same time, migrants from poorer regions are readily available to supply the 
wage labour. In coastal provinces and in peri-urban areas elsewhere, where the large-scale 
transfer of local labour into nonfarm employment has spurred the active growth of land 
rentals, and the specialized production of higher-value foods to supply the urban markets is 
more developed, wage employment in these household-run, entrepreneurial farms is 
widespread (Zhang and Donaldson 2010).  
In the past decade, agro-capital has also made a forceful entry into Chinese agriculture. This 
growth has also been fuelled by the central government’s plan of agricultural modernization, 
first formed as a national policy in the ninth Five-Year Plan passed in 1996. The central 
policies focus heavily on encouraging agribusiness companies to organize on a larger-scale, 
to shift towards the increasingly capital-intensive production of higher-value foods and to 
vertically integrate this with processing and marketing (Zhang and Donaldson 2008). In the 
first decade of the implementation of these policies, the number of ‘dragon-head’ 
agribusiness companies8 engaged in agricultural production increased nearly tenfold, from 
5,381 in 1996 to 61,268 in 2005 (Huang 2010). By 2011 that number had grown to over 
110,000 (Gui 2012). Many agribusinesses directly operate labour-hiring corporate farms, 
established on land either newly reclaimed by the companies or rented from villages. In the 
                                                
8 These are agribusinesses that have met certain requirements on capital, scale and technology use and 
thus acquired the designation from various levels of government. This qualification makes them 
eligible for government support that can include bank loans and tax deductions.  
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former, which are usually located in more remote areas, migrants are hired as wage workers; 
in the latter, companies are usually obligated to hire residents of the villages as wage 
workers, but can also hire migrants if more labour is needed (Zhang and Donaldson 2010).  
In today’s China, there are still more than 1,800 state farms in operation. While their regular 
employees only account for a tiny fraction of the total labour force in agriculture (1.2 per 
cent), these state farms use nearly 5 per cent of the country’s arable land and contribute to 10 
per cent of the gross national output in agriculture (NBS 2011). Since the decollectivization 
reform started, land in many of these state farms has also been contracted to the families of 
farm employees, and agricultural production is now organized in household-based units, 
although subjected to more control from the management over the production process. But 
these household sub-farms in state farms are usually in much larger scales than typical family 
farms in rural China. In Jiansanjiang state farm in Heilongjiang province, for example, the 
largest family farm is over 10,000 hectares, an unimaginable scale in other parts of China 
where the average size of family farms is below one hectare. Not surprisingly, these farms 
rely heavily on hired wage workers.  
Unfortunately, in the official statistics, ‘hired agricultural workers’ do not exist as a statistical 
category, and thus, there is no straightforward ways of knowing just how large exactly is this 
group on a national or regional scale. In a recent study, Huang et al. (2012) use national 
statistics on the costs of different farm products, which contain the costs of hired labour 
input, to estimate the extent of wage labour use in agricultural production. The results – the 
proportions of hired labour in total labour use – range from 4.4 per cent in grains, 8.5 per cent 
in vegetables, 28 per cent in dairy, to nearly 40 per cent in apples in 2009.  
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Since the production of food grains, in which the use of wage labour is the least prevalent, 
accounts for 68.7 per cent of the total sown area in the country, the share of hired labour in 
total labour input in the entire agricultural sector remains very small – ranging from 3−8 per 
cent according to Huang et al.’s (2012) estimate. There are, however, obvious caveats that 
make these estimates an inaccurate depiction of the extent of wage labour use in Chinese 
agriculture. First, the calculation of labour input in agricultural production – whether in 
number of days or monetary costs – is highly unreliable, especially when hired labour input is 
compared with family labour input. It is hard to imagine how family labour input can be 
accurately reported in surveys in either labour days or monetary costs, when the intensity of 
labour varies so greatly over time and no monetary payment is made to family members. 
Second, the averaged-out figures of hired labour input used in these national surveys conflate 
different types of wage labour use that range from day labourers hired by small family farms 
during peak time, to migrant workers employed seasonally by entrepreneurial farmers, to 
year-round wage employment in corporate farms. Thus, the number of people involved in 
wage work in agriculture as a proportion in the total agricultural labour force will definitely 
be much larger than the estimated percentage of hired labour in total labour input. 
Furthermore, these estimates reveal a clear trend of greater use of wage labour in the 
production of higher-value foods. Wage employment is a result of the growth of capitalist 
agriculture, which proceeds in a spatially uneven manner. As the shift toward specialized 
commercial production of higher-value foods spreads from coastal and peri-urban areas to 
other areas in rural China, the growth of wage employment in agriculture will accelerate.  
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4. The Dynamics of Wage Employment and the Circulation of Labour 
In China, two practices limit the ability of large-scale household surveys in providing reliable 
information on rural wage employment. First, China’s household registration (hukou) system 
classifies people by place of registration rather than place of work; second, the conceptual 
framework that guides data collection, based on the outdated Maoist rhetoric of classlessness, 
largely ignores class categories such as agricultural wage workers. But even better statistical 
data from snap-shot surveys, while good at showing the broad contour of the growth of wage 
employment in rural China, still face inherent difficulties in capturing the dynamics that 
characterize rural labour’s participation in wage employment. Yet, the dynamic relationships 
between wage employment and family farming are essential for understanding the role of 
wage employment in rural households’ social reproduction. In this section, I focus on the 
circulation of rural labour between wage employment and family farming, examine the three 
main mechanisms that drive such circulation (household division of labour, macro-level 
political-economic conditions, and the seasonal surge of labour demand in agricultural 
production), and highlight how such labour circulation is related to the imperatives of rural 
households’ social reproduction.  
4.1. Household division of labour 
In rural China, wage employment is always a part of a household strategy and connected to 
other labour activities of household members through a household division of labour. Thus, 
the dynamics of wage employment are shaped by both the household’s other economic 
activities and cycle of social-reproduction. In China’s context, this particularly means that 
wage employment is closely linked to family farming, which both regulates the supply and 
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demand of wage labour in the rural economy and provides the base for labour’s social 
reproduction when wage work becomes either unavailable or undesirable.  
For China’s millions of rural migrants, the institutional barriers created by the household 
registration system and socio-economic difficulties they face in their places of work 
determine that their careers in wage employment as migrant workers are mostly transient. 
Migrants faced a series of barriers that make it highly difficult to settle down their families 
and complete social reproduction in cities. These barriers range from an acute shortage of 
affordable family housing,9 difficulties in getting their children into urban schools,10 and the 
lack of access to healthcare, pension, and other welfare benefits.11 A 2005 national survey 
                                                
9 Typically, migrant workers are either housed by employers in on-site dormitories, or live in low-end 
rental housing concentrated in the so-called ‘villages in the city’ or on the outskirts of cities; neither of 
which are suitable for long-term family living. For more on migrants’ housing disadvantages in cities, 
see Wu (2004).  
10 Urban public primary and secondary schools now admit students regardless of their household 
registration. But due to the shortage of educational resources, which was intensified by the influx of 
migrants, enrolment into urban public schools remains highly competitive and migrant children still 
face disadvantages. Privately-run schools for migrant children have proliferated in recent years, but 
most are poorly equipped. For more on educational disadvantages faced by migrant children, see 
Liang and Chen (2007).  
11 Despite major progresses made in recent years, especially with the establishment of the New Rural 
Cooperative Medical System, China’s social welfare system remains highly fragmented. Neither the 
coverage that rural residents are now entitled to in their hometowns, nor the coverage they receive in 
their places of work is easily portable across administrative boundaries. 
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finds that, in eastern, central, and western regions, respectively, only 4.7, 5, and 6.6 per cents 
of the total labour force in villages managed to move the entire families out of rural areas and 
settle in cities, and the national average is 5.3 per cent (Li 2009, 111). 
These rural migrants sojourning in wage work away from home while remaining bonded to 
their villages of origin and family farming have been described as ‘flying kites’ (Yang 2008). 
The vast majority of them follow a two-stage process of circular migration. In the first, urban 
phase, migrants, mostly aged between 15 and 45, have relatively high competitiveness on the 
labour market12 and low costs in labour reproduction; they accumulate money through wage 
employment away from home to assist social reproduction at home, including paying for 
parents’ old-age care, children’s education, housing construction, and marriage costs. But 
when they reach middle age (45 and above), as their physical ability declines, they face more 
disadvantages on the labour market and rising costs in cities for their own labour 
reproduction. They then transition into the second, rural phase of their labour-force career by 
returning to rural areas to rely on family farming, the rural welfare system, and their young-
adult children, who by now have entered the first phase to replace them in the migrant labour 
force, for their reproduction.  
In both stages, migratory wage employment through migration is an integral part of the 
household division of labour for a large proportion of rural families. For these families, at any 
                                                
12 Numerous studies have shown that China’s booming manufacturing industries and urban services 
prefer workers who are young and more educated (Chan 2010). One nationally representative survey, 
for example, finds that, in 2004, the average age of the roughly 118 million rural migrants working in 
cities is 29, and 70 per cent of them were between 15 to 34 (Li 2009, 115). 
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given time, first, there are some household members – as a result of the generational or 
gender division of labour – engaged in wage employment; and second, the social 
reproduction of the whole family depends heavily on wage employment – now a part of the 
new pair of ‘twin crutches’ that sustain rural families. When we use the household as the unit 
of analysis and take a longitudinal perspective over the life course of rural labour, we find 
that wage employment is far more prevalent than what the one-off survey statistics show. 
One survey of 90 villages in one province, for example, finds that although only 42 per cent 
of the total labour force in the sample is in migration, 62 per cent of households have 
members in migrant work (Yang 2008, 49). We can also infer that a substantial proportion of 
the labour force that stays in rural areas has had experiences of migratory wage employment 
in an earlier life stage, and further more will have such experiences – now almost a rite of 
passage – at a later stage.  
4.2. Political-economic conditions 
For rural households relying on wage employment, individual members’ entry into and exit 
from wage employment are regulated by household economic strategies. Internally, these 
household strategies are shaped by the households’ demographic characteristics and control 
over productive assets, and thus vary across socioeconomic groups; externally, they also 
respond to conditions in the broader political economy. As a result, participation in wage 
employment not only varies on the individual level across the life course, as determined by 
the household division of labour; at the aggregate level, the extent of wage employment in the 
rural economy also changes over time with shifts in the political economy. In the half-
cultivator half-wage worker families that have become a dominant household economic 
strategy in today’s rural China, the bonding between family farming and wage employment 
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allows a more flexible circulation of household labour across sectoral, occupational, and 
geographical boundaries. Compared to households that are doing either wage work or family 
farming exclusively, this flexibility makes these households more responsive to changes in 
the political economy, and consequently, wage employment in rural China particularly 
sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations. 
In the late 1990s, deteriorating fiscal conditions and rising administrative burdens drove 
many local governments in inland provinces into predatory behaviours, resulting in excessive 
taxation levied on farming households (Bernstein and Lu 2000). In response to the declining 
profitability of family farming that such predatory taxation created, many households shifted 
more labour from farming to migratory wage employment. In recent years, in contrast, as the 
central leadership under the Hu-Wen administration reigned in on local predatory states, 
abolished the agricultural tax, implemented direct subsidies to farming households, and 
started to rebuild the rural welfare system: family farming’s viability thus improved. More 
rural labour circulated back from migratory wage work to farming, contributing to the rising 
problem of labour shortage in coastal China’s manufacturing zones (He and Dong 2009; 
Chan 2010, 521). The global financial crisis that started in 2008 was another shock in the 
macroeconomic environment that caused a dramatic shift in rural wage employment. An 
estimated 23 million migrant workers were laid off in the wake of the financial crisis (Cai and 
Chan 2009). Yet, such a massive shock to the urban economy did not result in a crisis of 
unemployment in Chinese cities. While this is partly because of the prompt reaction of the 
central government and effectiveness of its stimulus package released in 2009 (Chan 2010), 
the flexibility of rural households’ labour allocation and the resilience of the half-cultivator 
half-wage worker strategy of social reproduction played an equally important role.  
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When migrant workers were laid off from their urban wage jobs, most of them chose to 
return to their rural origins, where the family-farming half of their social reproduction could 
provide temporary relief. A survey of 105 villages across 19 provinces in 2008 found that the 
global crisis indeed caused an abrupt and strong reversal of labour circulation: in the second 
half of 2008, 56.1 per cent of the migrant workers in the first half of the year had returned to 
their rural origins; 43.5 per cent of the returnees returned as direct results of the economic 
downturn (factory closure, furloughing by employers due to lack of work, and reduction in 
wages) (Han and Wang 2009, 74). Many of these returned migrants were able to find local 
wage jobs, especially as construction workers – thanks to the housing construction boom 
fuelled by the remittances that workers had previously sent back; they could now also devote 
time to their own housing construction, which had been delayed by their migration (Yang and 
Liu 2009). Even when local wage jobs were insufficient to employ all returnees, their return 
did not cause a sharp rise in disputes over rented land, nor created a crisis of labour 
reproduction. In fact, only 9.4 per cent of migrants rented out their land when they left for 
wage work; the vast majority maintained family farming through a household division of 
labour.13  
Although the shock of global financial crisis caused a major disruption in wage-employment 
participation by the rural population, its impact on rural livelihoods and rural households’ 
                                                
13 Among those who rented out their land, only 4.5 per cent were unable to get their land back – 
mainly due to unfinished lease tenure. This further suggests that those households that rented in the 
land did not need to desperately cling onto the rented land for their own social reproduction either, but 
can at least still rely on their own allocated land. 
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social reproduction was relatively muted. For older migrants, it merely hastened the onset of 
the second, rural phase of their two-stage labour-force career course; for younger ones, the 
family-farming half of their household economy provided shelter during rough time, while 
their social reproduction needs (especially housing construction) also generated opportunities 
for their gainful employment at home (He and Dong 2009). Thanks to the land system that 
provides a solid grounding for smallholder family farming, rural China and the agricultural 
sector act as a reservoir for labour circulation across sectoral and geographical boundaries. In 
a longer time horizon, we will find a constant ebb and flow of rural labour in and out of wage 
employment, which is not necessarily correlated with urban labour market trends and is often 
not accurately captured in the snap shots from one-off statistical surveys.  
4.3. Seasonal labour demand in agriculture 
Identifying someone’s occupation is a tricky business in a context of prevalent cross- 
employment and flexible circulation between wage work and family farming, such as the case 
in rural China. When collecting labour statistics, China’s official statistical apparatus only 
assigns one occupation for each person in a given year; in cases of multiple jobs in that year, 
the job that has the longest duration is chosen, and when multiple jobs have similar durations, 
the one that generates the highest income is chosen (NBS 2011; Han 2009, 129). This 
practice of statistical convenience inflates the size of certain types of employment – for 
example, family farming, which includes not only active time in agricultural production, but 
also idling time when one is not otherwise gainfully employed. But it also conceals a large 
amount of part-time, short-duration work, especially in local wage employment. Such 
underestimation is particularly egregious in counting wage employment in agriculture, which 
typically has short duration during peak times and relies on informal labour.  
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While the rise of capitalist agriculture is the main driving force for the growth of wage-labour 
use in Chinese agriculture, different forms of capitalist agricultural production generate 
different types of demands for wage labour and different patterns of labour use. Corporate 
farms usually hire full-time employees in more formalized employment relations. The large-
scale corporate-run coffee plantations I studied in Yunnan province, for example, hired not 
only hundreds of migrant farm workers, but also a team of managerial and technical staff, and 
constructed housing to accommodate these employees in their remote, mountainous location 
(Zhang and Donaldson 2010). This type of wage employment is more likely to be counted in 
the national statistics that Huang et al. (2012) analyse. At least two other types of wage-
labour use, however, are more likely to be “illegible” (Scott 1998) to the state’s statistical 
apparatuses, and thus omitted in the national statistics.  
The geographic diversity of China and the sequential arrival of the peak production season 
have long allowed family farmers in rural China to engage in seasonal wage employment. In 
recent years, the growing regional specialization in agricultural production and easier 
availability of means of transportation has made this type of seasonal, migratory wage 
employment in agriculture more prevalent. The rise in regional specialization has been a clear 
trend in Chinese agriculture in the past two decades. For example, the spatial distribution of 
vegetable production has made a decisive shift from scattered peri-urban areas across the 
country to a greater concentration in specialized rural production bases, where now 80 per 
cent of the production acreage is located (Liu et al. 2002). Shandong province alone, with 6 
per cent of the nation’s total arable land, accounts for 14 per cent of the national vegetable 
production in 2010 (NBS 2011). This pattern of regional concentration is the most 
pronounced in cotton production. Thanks to concerted efforts in recent years to develop new 
cotton fields in Xinjiang, this northwestern province, with only 3.4 per cent of the nation’s 
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total arable land, now has 30 per cent of the total sown area for cotton in 2010 (NBS 2011); 
one quarter of the cotton farms in Xinjiang are larger than 100 mu (6.7 hectares) and thus, 
rely on hired wage labour (Huang et al. 2012).  
The concentration of production of these labour-intensive crops in some regions greatly 
increases the demand for temporary wage labour during the peak seasons. In Xinjiang, for 
example, to meet the surge in labour demand during the cotton-picking season from August 
to October every year, nearly one million temporary migrant workers are imported from rural 
areas across the country. In 2012, the state-owned railway system dispatched over 200 
chartered trains to ferry half a million of migrant wage earners to this far north-western 
corner of the country. This migrant labour force predominantly comprises rural women who, 
as a result of their household division of labour, stay in family farming in their home villages. 
They are typically paid a piece rate, which, due to increasing labour shortage, has risen to 
around 1.8 yuan per kilogram in 2012. An experienced worker can pick over 100 kilograms 
of cotton each day and earn more than 10,000 yuan over a two-month span. The labour 
shortage in recent years has even forced farm owners in Xinjiang to not only provide housing 
and food for workers, but also pay for their round-trip train tickets. While such short-term 
wage employment is surely not reflected in national statistics, for these migratory farm 
workers, it generates wage incomes that can easily eclipse their total cash incomes from 
family farming.  
Similar short-duration wage work in agriculture has also become widely available locally in 
rural areas where the commercial production of higher-value foods is prevalent. Even though 
family farms are still the dominant form of production and they can rely on family labour to 
meet off-peak production needs, the peak-time labour demand can only be met through hiring 
wage labour. The market orientation of this type of production has increased the labour-use 
31 
 
intensity in production, further raising the demand for hired wage labour. For example, in a 
large-scale, family-run orange farm I visited in southern Fujian province, after being 
harvested, the oranges still need to be inspected, sorted by size, soaked in disinfectant, dried, 
waxed, individually wrapped in plastic bags, and finally, loaded into crates. All these 
procedures were done manually by wage workers hired by the farm owner from neighbouring 
villages, after they had finished harvesting in their own smaller-scale family farms.  
The market orientation in commercial production has also shortened harvest time and further 
intensified the surge in labour demand, as these commercial farmers now must meet the strict 
requirements on delivery time and product conditions dictated by merchants or processors. 
Ren and Ye (2011), for example, find that the households engaged in small-scale commercial 
production of plums in a village in northern China usually had to finish harvesting in two 
days – before the merchants would move to another location – and thus had to hire a large 
group of temporary workers from neighbouring villages to do something that needed two 
weeks’ worth of family labour to complete. In contrast, in the subsistence-oriented grain 
production, even when family labour was insufficient to meet the labour demand in 
harvesting, villagers shunned wage labour but instead resorted to the traditional reciprocal 
labour exchanges among households.  
The growth of wage employment opportunities in local commercial agriculture not only 
reduces the availability of unpaid labour that family and social functions traditionally have 
relied on, but more importantly, it triggers a generalized process of labour commodification 
in rural life. When previously unpaid labour can now be commodified and conveniently fetch 
a wage income on the local labour market, the supply of unpaid labour quickly tightens up. In 
a county in southern Jiangxi province, where commercial orange farming thrives, as most 
working-age local women are busy with wage work during the harvest season, older folks 
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who have retired from active labour now have to be mobilized to engage in the unpaid labour 
of family caring (Chen 2012). Furthermore, social functions such as weddings and funerals, 
in which the labour needs have traditionally been met through reciprocal labour exchanges 
among villagers, now also have to use commodified wage labour (Chen 2012). This in turn 
creates opportunities for some residents to specialize in catering and funeral services and hire 
themselves out for wage incomes. Therefore, the rise of wage employment in local capitalist 
agriculture that is both more capital intensive and labour intensive than traditional subsistence 
farming has started a chain reaction in rural areas that tightens up labour supply, increases 
commodification of unpaid labour, and further creates wage job opportunities in local service 
industries. These increased wage employment opportunities then allow rural labourers who 
stay in family farming to take advantage of the discrepancies between labour time and 
production time that are inherent in agricultural production, and utilize the irregular and 
fragmented labour time they can divert from family farming to engage in agricultural or 
service wage work. 
5. Wage Work and Socioeconomic Differentiation  
Despite its rising prevalence and importance in rural livelihoods, wage work is neither 
invariably desirable to all rural households nor accessible. In fact, access to and dependence 
on wage work has become a key dimension in creating socioeconomic differentiation in rural 
China today. On one hand, some families have control over productive assets that provide 
them either more secure ways of social reproduction or even opportunities for accumulation; 
on the other, there are also households whose shortage of labour precludes them from wage 
work. Further, among the rural households that participate in wage employment, their 
differential combinations of wage employment with household-based petty commodity 
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production (mainly family farming) – both of which they rely on to maintain their precarious 
social reproduction – are differentiating them into what Bernstein (2006) calls ‘classes of 
labour’. 
The emergence of these classes of labour beckons a new thinking about the stratification 
structure in rural China. Studies since the 1990s have shown that wage income has become 
the most important source of household income inequality in rural China (Khan et al. 1992). 
But what has not been adequately addressed – at least in the English-language literature – is 
that, more than just income inequality, class-based social differentiation has also risen as a 
result of rural households’ differential access to and dependence on wage work, making 
today’s rural China a far cry from the ‘de-stratified society’ (Parish 1984) it once was. Yet, 
the existing literature on rural stratification still reflects an outdated focus on the relative 
importance of entrepreneurship and political power in creating wealth for the rural elites 
(Walder and Zhao 2006). The majority of the rural population, who are neither entrepreneurs 
nor political cadres, or related to them, are still treated as an undifferentiated mass – the so-
called ‘ordinary households’, which account for 67.3 per cent in Walder and Zhao’s (2006, 
366) sample. But, as the discussion here shows, since the rise of wage employment and re-
opening of market-oriented petty commodity production started over 30 years ago, China’s 
once undifferentiated peasantry has been subjected to the processes of differentiation and 
fragmentation that the participation in wage labour and petty commodity production entails.  
Now except for a small group of rural elite (no more than 10 per cent in most villages) who 
have accumulated considerable wealth from private entrepreneurship and have largely 
severed their ties – both physically and socially – with rural villages, the vast majority of 
rural population can be broadly divided into four such classes of labour, on the basis of 
households’ participation in various markets in pursuit of their reproduction – or, in some 
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cases, the aspiration to accumulation. These four classes, in a descending order of prosperity, 
are:  
(1) Large commercial farmer households. Their larger scales of family-farming operations 
– the result of land circulation through rental markets – both reduce their dependence on 
wage work and increase their demands for wage labour during peak seasons. Yet, male 
members in these families usually still participate in local wage employment during off 
seasons, and young adults may even enter migratory wage work for lifestyle motivations.  
(2) Half-cultivator half-wage worker households.  This is the largest of all groups, which 
typically ranges from 40-70 per cent of the population. They do not have sufficient land, 
capital, or skill to secure social reproduction in commercial farming or nonfarm wage 
work/self-employment alone. Thus, through various forms of household division of labour 
(by generation, by gender, by time period), they keep a footing in both sectors, which allow 
them to circulate family labour strategically in response to external political-economic 
conditions and internal demographic changes to maintain a precarious social reproduction.  
(3) De-agrarianized households.  These have abandoned family farming and moved all 
family labour into wage work or petty self-employment – typically through migration. 
However, their connections with rural villages and with family farming have not been 
terminated. Not only their household registrations remain rural, which still entitle them to 
access to land at home villages; more importantly, most of them plan to return to family 
farming when their needs of social reproduction in older ages necessitate so. There is further 
differentiation within this group between those engaged in wage work and those in petty 
commodity production – such as running a make-shift breakfast stall on the road side; but the 
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even the latter are more accurately considered disguised labourers rather than aspiring 
entrepreneurs, given their minimal level of capital and precarious positions in the market.  
(4) A rural underclass. These people sink into poverty mostly because of poor health, family 
dissolution (or failure in family formation), or loss of land to land grabs or state 
expropriation. To the extent that they are physically capable of, they are forced to engage in 
insecure wage employment.  
While all these classes of labour engage in wage employment in some way, their experiences 
with it and their relationships with capital are highly fragmented by the fact that they have to 
‘pursue their means of livelihood/reproduction across different sites of the social division of 
labour: urban and rural, agricultural and non-agricultural, wage employment and self-
employment (Bernstein 2006, 455)’. Moreover, the petty commodity production in family 
farming, which occupies a contradictory class location between capital and labour, subjects 
these classes of labour to further fragmentation generated by different and shifting realities 
and aspirations in family farming with regard to accumulation and exploitation. Thus, 
collective agency among these fragmented classes of labour is difficult to form. It is, 
however, not impossible. It can happen when the common foundation of their social 
reproduction is threatened by land grabs, or when fragmentation in wage employment is 
eliminated in large-scale corporate farming, in which an agribusiness rents a village’s land 
and organizes the entire village labour force into wage employment. The Wukan incident in 
2011 in Guangdong province, when villagers fought a prolonged battle against the collusion 
between corrupt local cadres and developers for illegal grabs of the village’s farmland is an 
example of the former type; the Menglian incident in the summer of 2008 in Yunnan 
province, in which farm workers in several villages rioted against the companies that 
operated rubber plantations there and the local government, which in the past had provided its 
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police force for the companies to oppress workers’ resistance, an example of the latter. These 
popular struggles, however, embody temporary and shifting alliances and erratic 
mobilization, rather than expressing the formation of any self-conscious and united class 
subject. The absence of large-scale proletarianization of the rural labour force only makes the 
classes of labour in rural China more differentiated and fragmented.  
6. Conclusions 
To sum up, wage employment has penetrated deeply into rural households’ livelihoods and 
has become a central pillar in China’s rural economy. The process has been propelled in the 
past three decades by rural industrialization, rural-to-urban migration, and rise of capitalist 
agriculture.  
The growth of wage employment, however, has not set in motion widespread 
proletarianization of the rural labour force and dissolution of family farming. Instead, wage 
employment and family farming are closely bonded to each other in rural China on multiple 
levels, through both the household-level division of labour and the individual-level 
circulation of labour between the two. Over the long span of their labour-force careers, rural 
labourers in China typically shift from migratory nonfarm wage employment in young 
adulthood to family farming in middle and old age. This allows them to match their declining 
human capital endowment and shifting social reproduction needs with different labour market 
conditions in urban and rural areas. In a shorter time frame, during their sojourning in 
migratory wage employment, they may be temporarily driven back to family farming by 
changes in urban labour markets, or, conversely, pushed into migratory wage work by 
intensified state predation in the rural political economy. Further, even within the span of a 
single year, rural labour in family farming can still enter multiple episodes of short-duration 
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wage employment that can generate incomes higher than those from farming operations, 
while those in migratory wage work also return in peak-labour and holiday seasons to assist 
with production in family farms and social-reproduction functions.  
These dynamic processes of labour circulation between family farming and wage 
employment are the central mechanisms that sustain the social reproduction of rural 
households in China in an increasingly capitalistic economy. These highly variable and 
fragmented experiences with both wage employment and family-based petty commodity 
production have made wage work not a ground for creating united class consciousness or 
alliances, but a venue for generating social differentiation and class fragmentation.  
Rural households’ pursuit of social reproduction through a range of combinations of wage 
labour with petty commodity production has become common in developing countries. While 
in rural China’s transition to capitalism, ecological constraints and the imperatives of capital 
accumulation have also driven rural households onto the same path, three conditions in the 
political economy are providing households more secure footings for social reproduction in 
both family farming and wage employment: first, the more equitable distribution of land and 
security of land rights based on rural citizenship; second, the growth in labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries, which has created sustained demands for wage labour in the capital 
accumulation process; and finally, a stronger state support for small farmers to gain skills and 
market access to upgrade into specialized cash-crop production. As a result, compared with 
their counterparts elsewhere, rural households in China face a crisis of reproduction on a 
much lesser extent.   
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